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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH in the interest of Ronald 
Jennings and Donald Jennings, minors, 
Respondent, Case No. 
- vs - 10799 
MYRTLE JENNINGS, 
Appellant. 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a decree of the Juvenile 
Court terminating all appellants' parental rights to 
her two youngest children. Appellant challenges 
the basis of the decree. 
DISPOSITION IN THE JUVENILE COURT 
In June of 1964, the children in question were 
adjudicated neglected and dependent children and 
were placed in the temporary custody of the Utah 
State Department of Public Welfare. 
In July of 1966, a petition was filed by the Wel-
fare Department praying for a termination of appel-
lants' rights to the children and seeking to have 
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them placed for adoption. 
In August of 1966, appellant petitioned for tem-
porary or permanent custody of the subject chil-
dren. In December of 1966, subsequent to a hearing 
in the Juvenile Court, a decree was entered denying 
appellant's petition for custody and permanently 
terminating all of her parental rights to the children. 
Appeal is made from that decree. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Juvenile 
Court's decree and the granting of her petition for 
custody of her two youngest children. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ronald and Donald Jennings are the twin illegi-
timate sons of Myrtle Jennings and an unknown 
father. The children reached four years of age on 
June 27, 1967. In June of 1964, at approximately the 
age of one year, the twins were adjudicated neglect-
ed and dependent children by the Juvenile Court 
and they were placed in the temporary custody of 
the Utah State Department of Public Welfare. The 
children were placed in successive foster homes, 
including the present foster home at which the chil· 
dren have resided in excess of two years. 
Prior to the above mentioned adjudication, the 
appellant had asked the Welfare Department to 
place Donald and Ronald Jennings, and her six 
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other children, in foster homes. Prior to action on 
the request, the appellant withdrew it. However, the 
Vv elfare Department instituted proceedings in its 
own behalf. 
At the initiation of the proceedings, the appel-
lant was on welfare. Subsequently, the appellant 
obtained employment at Hill Air Force Base. Con-
tributions to the support of the twins have amounted 
to slightly over two hundred dollars since the middle 
of 1964. Appellant has had periodic contact with the 
children since the placement of custody in others. 
She has a history of treatment for emotional 
disturbances. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE JUVENILE COURT. 
Appellant asserts that the findings of fact of the 
Juvenile Court are bottomed on insufficient evi-
dence. Challenge is first made by appellant to the 
finding that "the mother continues to be emotionally 
unstable" (Tr. 42). 
It is urged by appellant that such a finding 
ignores the testimony of Mr. Mottonen to the effect 
that there has been improvement in the emotional 
stability of Mr. Jennings, the appellant (Tr. 17, 19). 
Respondent concedes improvement in the emotion-
al stability of the appellant. However, it is submitted 
that an improvement in her condition in no· way 
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negates a finding of emotional instability. Improve-
ment of any kind must be considered in the light of 
the point from which progress has been made. If the 
initial condition is extreme, substantial change can 
be effected without there being a shift to the positive 
side of the scale. Mrs. Jennings' emotional instabili-
ty has been severe. The appellant's psychological 
makeup was characterized in the latter part of 1963 
as "an acute schizophrenic reaction in a person who 
is generally lacking in favorable psychological fea-
tures." (Dr. Malcolm N. Liebroder, September 2'7, 
1963.) 
Thus, the Juvenile Court did not "ignore" the 
testimony establishing a degree of improvement in 
the emotional stability of the appellant. The court 
merely found that, though a "little" improvement 
may have been made, the point had not been 
reached at which the custody of Donald and Ronald 
Jennings could properly be returned to the appel-
lant. Mr. Mottonen, on whose testimony appellant 
relies, recognized that even with the improvement 
evidenced by recent conduct, the appellant "feels 
a lot of hostility underneath" (Tr. 18), that "definitely 
she should receive counseling for herself" (Tr. 18), 
that if custody is returned to appellant "she would 
require help" (Tr. 18, 20), that "she doesn't complete-
ly understand about child care" (Tr. 18), and that 
she would need counseling for possibly two years 
or more (Tr. 22, 23). This testimony hardly charac-
terizes emotional stability. 
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Appellant also challenges the finding that "she 
has failed to provide a suitable environment for the 
children" (Tr. 42). Reliance is placed on the fact that 
there is only minimal evidence regarding a possible 
unsuitable physical environment. Of course, even 
assuming no deriliction on the part of appellant in 
the care of her children's physical surroundings, 
this ignores the poor emotional environment indi-
cated by the emotional instability of the appellant 
and the history of her improper care and supervi-
sion of her children, which is admitted by appellant 
(appellant's brief p. 7). 
Finally, appellant attacks the finding that "the 
children, if returned to the mother, would be sub-
jected to baby sitters and nursery schools and other 
unstable living conditions" (Tr. 42). It is argued that 
daytime placement of children by working mothers 
has become an accepted practice and that it would 
be ridiculous to deprive a mother of the custody of 
her children because of such a fact. 
Respondent is in agreement that the use by 
working mothers of child care facilities, when con-
sidered alone, is insufficient justification for depriv-
ing a mother of the custody of her children. Such 
conditions have indeed become commonplace in 
modern society. However, when the use of baby-
sitters or nursery schools is considered in the con-
text of two child histories replete with emotional 
and physical instabilities, such a use becomes high-
ly relevant in a determination of the proper custody 
of the children. 
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Respondent submits that there is not only suf-
ficient evidence but abundant evidence to support 
the findings of fact of the Juvenile Court. 
POINT II 
THE JUVENILE COURT WAS CORRECT IN AP-
PL YING THE STANDARD OF THE BEST INTEREST 
OF THE CHILD. 
That the best interest of the child is the para-
mount consideration in child custody cases is the 
nearly universal rule repeatedly enunciated by the 
Utah Supreme Court. E.g., In re Cooper. 17 Utah 2d 
296, 410 P.2d 475 (1966). 
It is clear that in placing a child in the legal 
custody of an individual, the Juvenile Court must 
give primary consideration to the welfare of the 
child. Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-100 (12) (Supp. 1967). 
Apparently, the appellant is arguing that when, in 
addition to mere legal custody, a permanent depri-
vation of the rights of a natural parent is involved, 
the standard to be applied is not that of the best in-
terest of the child. Appellant bases this argument on 
Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-109 (1) (a) (Supp. 1967) which 
provides: 
(1) The court may decree a termination of all pa-
rental rights with respect to one or both parents if 
the court finds: 
(a) That the parent or parents are unfit or in-
competent by reason of conduct or condition seri-
ously detrimental to the child. 
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Appellant contends that the Juvenile Court applied 
the best interest of the child test and that this is not 
the standard specified in the provision cited above. 
It is asserted by appellant that a termination of all 
parental rights may be decreed only upon a finding 
that the parent or parents are unfit or incompetent. 
First, it must be noted that the Juvenile Court 
found specifically that the appellant "is unfit or in-
competent to have the care of the children and their 
custody because of her conduct and the conditions 
enumerated above and in past hearings which 
would be seriously detrimental to the children's wel-
fare ... " (Tr. 43). This finding speaks in terms near-
ly identical to those of the above quoted statute 
authorizing a termination of all parental rights. Thus, 
it cannot be said that the Juvenile Court failed to 
recognize and apply the appropriate standard. 
Further, respondent contends that the language 
contained in Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-109 (1) (a) is but 
a restatement of the best interest of the child test. 
Any time the best interest of the child is found 
to reside with those other than the natural parents 
it would seem that, by definition, it has been found 
that the parents are unfit or incompetent for some 
reason or reasons. For if the parents are fit and com-
petent, the presumption that the best interest of the 
child is with its natural parents would not be over-
come and the natural parents would be entitled to 
-::ustody. See D ... P ... v. Social Service and Child 
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Welfare Dept., No. 10892, Aug. 28, 1967; Walton v. 
Coffman, 110 Utah 1, 169 P.2d 97 (1947). That the 
"best interest of the child" standard is to be applied 
in cases involving a termination of parental rights 
is further indicated by reference to the stated pur-
poses of the Juvenile Court Act found in Utah Code 
Ann. § 55-10-63 (Supp. 1967) wherein it is provided 
that "it is the purpose of this act to securP ~or each 
child coming before the juvenile court such care, 
guidance, and control, preferably in his own home, 
as will serve his welfare and the best interests of the 
state ... " 
POINT III 
THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IT WAS IN THE 
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN TO PERMA-
NENTLY DEPRIVE APPELLANT OF ALL PARENTAL 
RIGHTS. 
The appellant claims that the decree terminat-
ing all her parental rights in Donald and Ronald Jen-
nings amounted to an abuse of discretion. This con-
clusion is based, in part, on the fact that there was 
no evidence, including psychological evidence re-
lating to the fitness of the foster parents, as to the 
desireability of the foster home. (Appellant's brief 
pp. 15 & 16). 
Respondent submits that such evidence is not 
particularly relevant in a determination of whether 
the appellant is unfit or incompetent to have the 
custody of her children. State in Interest of K ... 
B ... , 7 Utah 2d 398, 326 P.2d 395 (1958). There may 
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be instances where evidence of the character of the 
foster home would be important, but where the fit-
ness of the pa.rent is in question and it is found that 
the parent is, in fact, unfit, a termination of parentai 
rights is appropriate irrespective of the condition 
of the foster home. Stated another way, the unsuit-
ability of the foster home does not make the naturai 
home suitable. If the foster home is found to be un-
desirable it is then incumbant upon the State of Utah 
to effect placement elsewhere, not to return custody 
to an unfit parent. 
That the appellant should have her rights in the 
children terminated because of her being unfit or 
incompetent by reason of conduct or condition seri-
ously detrimental to her children is amply justified 
by the facts in this case. A review of those facts re-
veals the following: the appellant is emotionally 
unstable (see Point I); the children involved are the 
result of the sexual indiscretions of appellant; the 
children have been under foster care in excess of 
three years and in their present foster home in ex-
cess of two years; the appellant failed to reasonably 
contribute to the financial support of the subject 
children for substantial periods when she was finan-
cially capable of doing so; the appellant's lack of 
ability to adequately care for and discipline children 
is indicated by the conduct and attitudes of her 
other six children which variously include involve-
ment with the juvenile authorities, an intense dis-
satisfaction with conditions in the home, and place-
ment under foster care; a return of custody to the 
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appellant would result in a necessary use of child 
care facilities which is not consistent with the wel-
fare of children whose lives have already been 
punctuated with physical disruptions and emotional 
crises. 
Respondent asserts that the above facts inexor-
ably led the Juvenile Court to the conclusion that 
the welfare of Donald and Ronald Jennings could 
best be served by terminating appellant's rights in 
the children. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence abundantly supports the findings 
and decree of the Juvenile Court. The Court was 
correct in applying the standard of the best interest 
of the child, and the welfare of the children in-
volved dictated a termination of all rights of the 
appellant to Donald and Ronald Jennings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
ROBERT J. STANSFIELD 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1 
